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Disability Rights, Disability Discrimination, and Social Insurance
Are statutory social insurance programs, which provide contributory tax-based
income support to people with disabilities, compatible with the disability rights
movement’s ideas? Central to the movement that led to the Americans with Disabilities
Act1 is the insight that physical or mental conditions do not disable; barriers created by
the environment or by social attitudes keep persons with physical or mental differences
from participating in society as equals. 2 This civil rights model of disability contrasts
with medical models that frame disability as a bodily or mental defect or condition.3
The conflict between the civil rights approach and insurance seems apparent. A
person takes out insurance to deal with tragedy, such as premature death, or damage, such
as accidental harm to an automobile or home. Social insurance, for example, the United
States Social Security old-age and disability programs, consists of government-run
insurance to cover risks of advanced age and disability for which the private market has

1

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
See, e.g., Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction, Discrimination,
and Activism, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 3, 6-14 (1988) (developing and elaborating on minority group model of
people with disabilities); Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and
Capitalism, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, at 172, 174 (Lennard J. Davis ed. 1997) (describing
Aminority-group model of disability@); Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of
Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 814-16 (1966) (applying civil rights “integrationist” approach to disability);
Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of
Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1357-58 (1993)
(describing civil rights model of disability); see also Paula E. Berg, Ill/legal: Interrogating the Meaning
and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL=Y REV. 1, 9
(1999) (AThis social-political model rejects the premise of the moral and biomedical perspectives that
disability is inherent within the individual. . . . [I]t understands disability as contextual and relational, . . .
as a broader social construct reflecting society=s dominant ideology and cultural assumptions. While it
acknowledges the existence of biologically based differences, the social-political model locates the
meaning of these differencesBand the individual=s experience of them as burdensomeBin society=s
stigmatizing attitudes and biased structures rather than in the individual.@) (footnotes omitted). It is
possible to draw distinctions among various forms of social, civil rights, and minority group models, but
that step is not necessary for developing the argument in this Article. See generally infra text
accompanying notes _____ (discussing social model in greater depth, including recent criticisms).
3
See infra text accompanying notes ___ (discussing variations on civil rights model).
2
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not provided affordable coverage.4 But the civil rights approach to disability posits that
disability is not a risk, not tragedy, and not a damage or defect.5 Instead it is a
maladaptation of society to human variation.
Does there remain a justification for programs such as disability insurance? Is
there even a justification for expansion of social insurance, for example, to establish
partial disability pensions or expanded health coverage, a justification that is compatible
with disability rights ideas? This Article will answer yes to both questions. It will
suggest expansion of social insurance based on the recognition that society at present
imposes physical and attitudinal harms whose costs to individuals with disabilities should
be publicly insured.
Most legal commentary on disability issues concerns itself with the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its role in combating disability discrimination,6

4

See infra text accompanying notes __. Those without high incomes also lack the ability to accumulate
private savings to cover long-term disease or disability, or even old-age. See infra text accompanying notes
___.
5
This approach to disability as something other than a tragic condition manifests itself in challenges to
various legal developments, such as actions for wrongful life brought on behalf of infants born with
disabilities that could have been detected by genetic testing, see Wendy Hensel, The Disabling Impact of
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141 (2005), and damages awards
for hedonic loss stemming simply from the fact of long-term disability, see Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo
Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007).
6
Recent articles of interest on the topic of disability discrimination, particularly employment
discrimination, include Bradley A. Arehart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181 (2008); Jill C. Anderson, Just
Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008); Carrie
Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA,
29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59 (2008); Seth D. Harris, Disabilities Accommodations, Transaction
Costs, and Mediation: Evidence from the EEOC’s Mediation Program, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2008);
Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305 (2008); Jamie
L. Ireland, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Its Prohibition of Employment
Discrimination, 28 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 183 (2008); Dustin Riddle, Disability Claims for Alcohol-Related
Misconduct, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 699 (2008); Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 522 (2008). A helpful guide to the basic disability discrimination law and some of the most
important of the discrimination scholarship is RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
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particularly employment discrimination.7 The social welfare aspects of disability law
have been neglected in this debate, despite the salience of income support issues to
persons with disabilities and their families.8 Over the past ten years, however, a number
of legal scholars have taken up the topic of disability-related social interventions other
than employment discrimination law,9 and one prominent writer has gone so far as to call
social welfare the “Future of Disability Law.”10 This Article adds to the current
discussion by exploring social insurance from a disability rights perspective.
Part I of this Article takes up social insurance in general, defining it and
describing Social Security Disability Insurance, the primary American social insurance
program for individuals with disabilities. Disability Insurance contrasts with welfare
initiatives, which fall outside the contributory social insurance definition. Part II
discusses the rationale for social insurance, as opposed to the other public interventions
that address disability and additional hazards of life in a free market economy. It relates
social insurance to work, noting the significance of the Social Security Disability

(6th ed. 2007); see also Mark C. Weber, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY LAW (2007) (analyzing basic
doctrine and leading cases).
7
See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1807, 1811-12 (2005) (discussing tendency of legal scholarship on ADA to emphasize employment
discrimination).
8
Although much of the disability studies scholarship that relates to law focuses on discrimination, social
welfare policy is an emerging disability studies topic. See Peter Blanck & Helen A. Schartz, Guest Editor’s
Introduction, 26 DISABILITY STUD. Q. No. 1 (2006) (describing “the economic reality that an unacceptably
high proportion of persons with disabilities in the U.S. and abroad live in poverty” as increasingly
important issue in disability studies).
9
See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998); Matthew Diller,
Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361
(1996); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for
Persons with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123 (1998).
10
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004). An article that makes
similarly broad claims for the importance of social welfare law and suggests extensive policy reforms is
Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 889
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Insurance work history requirement. Part III asks about the specific role of social
insurance against disability in the contemporary economy. Part IV poses, and tries to
answer, the question whether social insurance against disability is fully consistent with a
civil rights model of disability. Part V proposes expansion of social insurance for
persons with disabilities and explains how this step is consistent with a civil rights
approach to disability.
I. What Is Social Insurance?
The term “social insurance” is most commonly used for mandatory government
programs that provide monetary protection against risks associated with living in an
industrial or post-industrial society in which income typically derives from paid work.11
Principles of social insurance, as opposed to relief or welfare programs, 12 include: (1)
entitlements are work-related, based on work history or the contribution of specific
amounts of taxes, and sometimes on current connection to the work force; (2) means tests
11

See Social Insurance, Britannica Online Encyclopedia,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/551273/socialinsurance#tab=active~checked%2Citems~checked&title=social%20insurance%20-%20Britannica%20Online%20Encyclopedia (visited Aug. 11, 2008); What Is Social Insurance, National
Academy of Social Insurance, http://www.nasi.org/info-url_nocat2708/infourl_nocat_show.htm?doc_id=50066 (visited Aug. 11, 2008).
12
A contrast may also be drawn between, on the one hand, social insurance benefit programs financed by
payroll or other dedicated taxes and, on the other, tax expenditure schemes, which indirectly subsidize
benefits by granting tax exemptions. The present American system of allowing tax exemptions for
employee group plan health insurance premiums is an example of the latter. Andrea Louise Campbell,
Americans’ Views on Public Benefits and Costs, National Academy of Social Insurance (may 29, 2008),
http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/Campbell_NASI_Presentation_05_29_08.pdf. Another mechanism of
financing benefits is placing mandates on employers (or employees) without providing tax breaks or other
subsidies, forcing the target of the regulation to pay. Like tax expenditure plans, this may mask the real
cost of the public policy. Lawrence H. Thompson, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Social
Welfare Strategies, SOC. SEC. BULL., Fall 1994, at 3, 10. Nevertheless, employer mandates and various
current and proposed tax expenditure programs may be highly beneficial aspects of public policy with
regard to persons with disabilities. See Francine J. Lippman, Enabling Work for People with Disabilities: A
Post-Integrationist Revision of Underutilized Tax Incentives, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 393 (2003) (discussing tax
incentives); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy
for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 171 (1998) (discussing employer mandates); see also
Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1053 (2006) (analyzing impact of various tax provisions on people with disabilities).
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(maximums for outside income and assets) are not used, or are used only sparingly; (3)
the program is contributory in the sense that it is largely or fully supported by specific
taxes, typically taxes on wages that the potential beneficiaries pay; (4) participation is
universal and compulsory, to avoid adverse selection and to have effects that are neutral
with regard to changes of employer or employment; (5) rights to benefits are clearly
defined by law. 13
Social insurance as a political development is usually traced to Otto von
Bismarck’s institution of old-age pension and other benefits programs in Germany in the
1880s in order to undermine support for socialism.14 Workers’ compensation for
industrial accidents was first introduced in the United States at the state government
level. Between 1911 and 1920, state legislatures in 45 states passed workers’
compensation laws.15 Unemployment insurance and other programs also began at the
state level,16 but the Federal Social Security Act of 193517 is the key development in
American social insurance. It ushered in a universal program of old-age security and a
federal-state unemployment insurance program, created non-contributory, means-tested

13

OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND STATISTICS, UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1997).
14
See PAUL H. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 242 (2d ed. 1939) (describing German
program); see also Britannica Online Encyclopedia, supra note __ (“The first compulsory social insurance
programs on a national scale were established in Germany under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck: health
insurance in 1883, workmen’s compensation in 1884, and old-age and invalidity pensions in 1889.”). In
their history of United States social insurance and related policy initiatives, Edward Berkowitz and Kim
McQuaid place less emphasis on European antecedents and greater emphasis on the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century American institution of private employer programs providing security to workers
against losses from injury, disease, and unemployment, as well as promoting company housing and stock
ownership, all as a means to uplift industrial workers and promote loyalty. EDWARD BERKOWITZ & KIM
MCQUAID, CREATING THE WELFARE STATE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY REFORM
11-34 (1988).
15
BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note __, at 46 (collecting sources).
16
Id. at 111.
17
Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397jj (2000 & Supp.
V 2006)).
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welfare programs, and set the groundwork for future social insurance programs such as
Disability Insurance18 and Medicare,19 as well as contemporary federal and federally
assisted welfare for needy people with disabilities who lack connection to the
workforce.20
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) is the most significant American social
insurance program affecting working-age persons with physical or mental disabilities.21
As with Social Security for retirement in old age, workers contribute payroll taxes, which
employers match with their own contributions; these amounts constitute the Social
Security Disability Trust Fund.22 In order to be deemed “insured” for purposes of the
disability program, a person must have worked a sufficient number of calendar quarters
(based not on actual quarters of work but on earnings from work per year) during his or
her lifetime and before the onset of disability.23 Then if the person cannot “engage in any
substantial gainful activity24 by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period” of a year or result
18

See John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: the History of a Federal Program Insuring
Earners Against Disability, SOC. SEC. BULL., No. 3, 2005-06, at 1 (describing history of Disability
Insurance program).
19
See EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, ROBERT BALL AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 120-63 (describing
history of Medicare program).
20
See id. at 207-09 (describing development of Supplemental Security Income program).
21
For a comprehensive description of various disability programs in the United States, including those that
provide income support and in-kind assistance, see Robert Silverstein, Emerging Disability Policy
Framework: A Guidepost for Analyzing Public Policy, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1691 (2000).
22
See 26 U.S.C. § 3111a (2000). The fund exists on the books of the Social Security Administration, but is
not computed separately for general federal budget accounting purposes. In a sense the fund is imaginary
because it is invested in United States government bonds, which economically is the same as the
government never issuing the bonds; current payroll tax payments fund current disability insurance benefits
essentially establishing what is termed a pay-as-you-go system. See generally Weber, supra note __ at 925
(collecting sources).
23
42 U.S.C. § 414 (2000).
24
Generally speaking, substantial gainful activity is that which earns more than an average of $ 940 per
month net of impairment-related work expenses, as of 2008. Substantial Gainful Activity, Social Security
Online (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/sga.html. With regard to the DI program (but
not the SSI program), the amount is higher for persons who are blind. Id. Special rules and exceptions
exist with respect to the application of the substantial gainful activity test. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574 (2008).
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in death,25 the person is entitled to monthly payments in an amount roughly proportional
to past taxed earnings, within established benefit limits. 26 In June, 2008, the number of
persons receiving DI was 7,912,000, at an average monthly amount of $1,004.20
(average spousal and children’s benefits amounts were $266.50 and $299.30,
respectively).27 There is a modest redistribution effect in which persons who are at the
lower end of the benefits scale get slightly more compared to their contributions than
those at the higher end do, but that is not inconsistent with social insurance principles;
payouts need not be strictly proportional to pay-ins as long as some essential connection
exists between benefits and work-related tax contributions.28
Individuals who receive DI are eligible for Medicare Part A, which covers
hospital costs and a few other medical expenses, and Medicare Part B, which covers
doctor bills and other medically necessary and preventive services subject to various
costs, after 24 months on DI.29 They are also eligible to participate in prescription drug
coverage under Medicare Part D.30 Because the basic Medicare benefit is supported by
the Medicare payroll tax,31 it too qualifies as social insurance, and is part of the package

25

§ 423(d)(1)(A).
§ 423. Limited benefits are also available to spouses and children. There is a five-month waiting period
from the onset of disability to when payments begin. Social Security Handbook, Social Security Online
(Jan. 30, 2006), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.05/handbook-0502.html.
27
See Monthly Statistical Snapshot, Office of Policy, U.S. Social Security Administration,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/ (visited Aug. 13, 2008).
28
See BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note __, at 135-36 (discussing similar situation with regard to oldage benefits). Of course, even in private insurance, payouts are at most only roughly proportional to
premiums paid.
29
The most lucid explanation of Medicare eligibility and benefits is found in Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, Medicare & You (2008), http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf.
The statutory citation for the program is 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395iii (2000 & Supp. V 2006).
30
See sources cited supra note __ [previous note].
31
The Medicare Part A payroll tax is 1.45%, DI is 0.9%, and Old-Age and Survivors Insurance is 5.3%.
These are matched by employers, and self-employed persons pay both shares. For all but the Medicare Part
A assessment, taxable earnings are capped at $102,000 per year in 2008. Office of Policy, U.S. Social
26
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that persons who meet the disability standard receive in return for the contributions taken
from their paychecks during their working careers.
As social programs go, DI is middle-aged. In 1934-35, President Franklin
Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security proposed social insurance for temporary
disability and urged further study of social insurance for permanent disability.32
Unemployment insurance, old-age insurance, and federal support for welfare programs
proved to be higher priorities, however, and disability insurance was not part of the
original Social Security Act of 1935.33 Even the Economic Security Committee’s
proposal for a federal-state health insurance program fell by the wayside. 34 American
Medical Association opposition to health insurance initiatives spilled over into opposition
to a national disability insurance program,35 but Presidents Roosevelt and Truman
continued to voice strong support for social insurance for disability.36 Initial dissent from
private insurance interests declined over time.37 In the early 1950s, Congress approved a
program called the “Disability Freeze,” in which workers who became disabled after
working long enough to earn old-age Social Security benefits at retirement received
protection from loss of old-age benefits as a result of low or no earnings in the years

Security Administration, Program Highlights, 2007-2008,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/prog_highlights/ (visited Aug. 13, 2008).
32
EDWIN E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 208 (1963) (reproducing report)
33
See DOUGLAS, supra note __, at 84-125 (describing history of Social Security legislation).
34
Kearney, supra note __, at 2-3.
35
BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note __, at 172. The American Medical Association had been receptive
to federal disability insurance prior to the health insurance proposal. MONROE BERKOWITZ, DISABLED
POLICY 186 (1987).
36
Experts within and outside the Social Security Administration, including Arthur Altmeyer and Edwin
Witte, pushed the disability proposal. See Kearney, supra note __, at 5.
37
See Interview by Peter A. Corning with Roswell Perkins, Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare during the Eisenhower Administration, at 28, 86-92 (Oral History Research Office, Columbia
University, Social Security Administration Project, Part IV, No. 160, Apr. 2, 1966). Some opposition
remained, however. See Kearney, supra note __, at 7-8.
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between disability and retirement age.38 The freeze demonstrated that a federal
disability-based insurance program was workable, 39 and in 1956 Congress established the
DI program essentially as it exists today.40 The one major modification came in 1960,
when Congress removed the original requirement that a recipient of benefits had to be
fifty years old. The Eisenhower administration had opposed the DI program at first, but
not vigorously, and eventually supported the elimination of the age minimum.41 In 1965,
Congress established Medicare as a natural complement to existing Social Security cash
programs, manifesting what historians Edward Berkowitz and Kim McQuaid term “social
security’s halo effect.”42
Persons who do not meet the DI earnings requirements before onset of disability
and who are poor may qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), as may persons
who are poor and whose DI amount is lower than the SSI amount plus a $20 income
disregard.43 The SSI payment for an eligible individual is $637 per month as of 2008.44

38

Dating this program is something of a challenge. Congress passed a freeze bill in 1952, but in a HouseSenate compromise, it was never put into operation. See BERKOWITZ, supra note __ [Monroe], at 71-72.
In 1954, Congress passed a bill that actually went into effect. Id. at 72. Roswell Perkins supported the
freeze. Kearney, supra note __, at 8-9.
39
Other civilian disability-related programs, such as one for civil-defense workers, also proved workable,
and this bolstered the DI proposal. Kearney, supra note __, at 6, 9-10.
40
Pub. L. No. 84-880, 70 Stat. 815 (1956).
41
Roswell Perkins described Secretary Folsom of HEW as torn over whether to support the DI program.
Interview, supra note __, at 28. Secretary Flemming led the support for removing the age requirement.
Berkowitz, supra note __ [Monroe], at 109-10.
42
BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note __, at 212.
43
Can I Receive Social Security Benefits and SSI?, Social Security Online (Apr. 23, 2008), http://ssacusthelp.ssa.gov/cgibin/ssa.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=320&p_created=959575695&p_sid=IB3x_cbj&p_accessibili
ty=0&p_redirect=&p_lva=&p_sp=cF9zcmNoPSZwX3NvcnRfYnk9JnBfZ3JpZHNvcnQ9JnBfcm93X2Nud
D00OCw0OCZwX3Byb2RzPSZwX2NhdHM9MTA1JnBfcHY9JnBfY3Y9MS4xMDUmcF9zZWFyY2hfd
HlwZT1hbnN3ZXJzLnNlYXJjaF9ubCZwX3BhZ2U9MQ**&p_li=&p_topview=1. Persons who are poor
and over 65 may also qualify for SSI, and need not show disability. Id. If they have worked enough in
their lifetimes to qualify for Social Security’s old-age insurance, they will receive SSI only if their social
insurance retirement amount is very low.
44
Id. An eligible couple receives $956. Because many recipients also are paid DI or have other limited
sources of income, the average benefit amount is $492 per month as of June, 2008. See Monthly Statistical
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Eligibility is measured by both income and assets.45 The SSI program applies the same
disability standard as DI,46 but the population it serves differs in important respects. DI’s
earnings requirements and the operation of its disability standards cause the benefit
largely to go to individuals in their fifties and early sixties who have weak to modest
educational backgrounds and are, in the words of one analyst, “prematurely enfeebled”
due to injury or disease.47 SSI largely serves individuals whose disabling conditions have
been with them since birth; a large fraction have mental retardation. 48 Many SSI
recipients work, often at sheltered or supported employment jobs.49 States may provide
supplements for SSI amounts.50 In most states, persons on SSI automatically qualify for
medical assistance under the Medicaid program.51
SSI emerged in 1973, the only surviving part of the guaranteed annual income
proposals then current in discussions of welfare reform.52 It replaced federally assisted

Snapshot, Office of Policy, U.S. Social Security Administration,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/ (visited Aug. 13, 2008).
45
The income test depends on the state in which the person lives, and includes a number of disregards and
income-deeming rules; assets other than one’s home, car, family burial plots and small life insurance and
burial funds generally cannot exceed $2000 ($3000 for a couple). Supplemental Security Income, Social
Security Online (June, 2007), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/11000.html#part1.
46
42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2000). The substantial gainful activity test for blind persons is the same as that for
persons with other disabilities, however. See supra note __ (describing test).
47
See BERKOWITZ, supra note __, at 194-195.
48
See Aaron J. Prero, Quantitative Outcomes of the Transitional Employment Training Demonstration, in
DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 273, 274 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (reporting that 29%
of SSI recipients receive payments on basis of primary finding of mental retardation).
49
See L. Scott Muller et al., Labor-Force Participation and Earnings of SSI Disability Recipients: A
Pooled Cross-Sectional Times Series Approach to the Behavior of Individuals, SOC. SEC. BULL., Mar.
1996, at 22, 34-36 (noting prevalence of sheltered and supported employment among SSI recipients).
50
Can I Receive Social Security Benefits and SSI?, Social Security Online (Apr. 23, 2008), http://ssacusthelp.ssa.gov/cgibin/ssa.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=320&p_created=959575695&p_sid=IB3x_cbj&p_accessibili
ty=0&p_redirect=&p_lva=&p_sp=cF9zcmNoPSZwX3NvcnRfYnk9JnBfZ3JpZHNvcnQ9JnBfcm93X2Nud
D00OCw0OCZwX3Byb2RzPSZwX2NhdHM9MTA1JnBfcHY9JnBfY3Y9MS4xMDUmcF9zZWFyY2hfd
HlwZT1hbnN3ZXJzLnNlYXJjaF9ubCZwX3BhZ2U9MQ**&p_li=&p_topview=1 (listing states).
51
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; Understanding Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Online (2008),
http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm.
52
BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note __, at 207.
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state income support for the impoverished elderly persons and individuals with
permanent and total disabilities.53 SSI is not a true social insurance program, for it is
funded out of general federal revenues rather than a dedicated tax on earnings and it is
means-tested, that is, eligibility is subject to income and asset restrictions.
II. The Rationale for Social Insurance
Widespread concern over the poverty of elderly people and workers who suffered
industrial accidents or were temporarily displaced from wage employment fuel political
support for social insurance programs. 54 Social insurance seemed an attractive means to
undercut the left wing not just in Bismarck’s Germany but also in the Depression-era
United States, where mainstream politicians were alarmed at Townsend Clubs and
support for other share-the-wealth schemes.55 Politicians also recognized that if public
53

See id. (discussing operation of program and sources of political support).
DOUGLAS, supra note __, at 5-21 (discussing demand for old-age security and unemployment
protection); see ARTHUR J. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 4 (1968) (discussing
Franklin Roosevelt’s support for workers’ compensation, old-age pensions, and unemployment insurance
while still in New York state government); WITTE, supra note __, at 21 (quoting charge of Federal
Committee on Economic Security staff in 1934 to “devote its major attention” to “protection of the
individual against dependency and distress,” including “accident insurance health insurance, invalidity
insurance, unemployment insurance, retirement annuities, survivors’ insurance, family endowment, and
maternity benefits.”); see also Nancy J. Altman, Social Security and the Low-Income Worker, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1139, 1140 (2007) (“Before Social Security, people worked as long as they could hold jobs. But this
was an insecure state of affairs. The fast pace of many jobs ‘wears out its workers with great rapidity. The
young, the vigorous, the adaptable, the supple of limb, the alert of mind, are in demand . . . . Middle age is
old age.’ Once older workers lost their jobs, they could seldom find new ones. Older people almost never
had sufficient savings to last until death.”) (quoting E.T. DEVINE, MISERY AND ITS CAUSES 125 (1909), as
quoted in ABRAHAM EPSTEIN, FACING OLD AGE 20-21 (1922)) (footnotes omitted).
55
William Haber & Wilbur J. Cohen, Theory and Philosophy of Social Security, in READINGS IN SOCIAL
SECURITY 38, 39 (William Haber & Wilbur J. Cohen eds. 1948). Francis Townsend, a retired doctor,
gained immense popularity with his plan that everyone over age 60 receive a federal pension of $200 a
month as long as the recipient spent the entire sum by the end of the month. See BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID,
supra note __, at 114 (“Although the Townsend program was bizarre economics, it made very good
politics.”); WITTE, supra note __, at 95-96 (“The thousands of letters which the members [of the House of
Representatives] received in support of the plan worried them greatly. With the exception of probably not
more than half a dozen members, all felt that the Townsend plan was utterly impossible; at the same time
they hesitated to vote against it.”). Townsend was by no means the only “thunder on the left.” DOUGLAS,
supra note __, at 69-83 (using term to describe Townsend movement as well as proposal for federal allinclusive unemployment compensation at 100% of prevailing wages); see ALTMEYER, supra note __, at 10
(“The President was, of course, concerned about the Townsend Plan. But he was even more concerned
54
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programs employed a tax specifically dedicated to the relevant benefits, citizens would
feel an entitlement to the payouts and would oppose efforts to repeal the programs or
diminish benefits.56
On a more abstract level, the rationale for government-run, compulsory and
universal social insurance is the absence of a viable market for private insurance for risks
such as industrial disease, periodic unemployment, old-age, chronic illness, and
disability. 57 In general, private insurers have been reluctant to offer coverage in these
areas, at least in the absence of government programs underwriting the worst of the
risks. 58 They fear adverse selection by which only those most prone to the conditions

about Senator Huey Long’s “share the wealth” movement.”). Long’s amorphous every-man-a-king
proposal called for widespread redistribution of financial resources from rich to poor. Id.
56
See Andrea Louise Campbell & Kimberly J. Morgan, Financing the Welfare State: Elite Politics and the
Decline of the Social Insurance Model in America, 19 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 173, 173 (2005) (“Levied
over a broad swath of the population, these [payroll] taxes generate a large amount of revenue, yet are
politically acceptable because people see them as payments that entitle them to benefits in return.”).
President Roosevelt was quoted as saying, “With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my
social security program.” ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE
NEW DEAL 309 (1958). The entitlement is political rather than legally vested, however. During the Red
Scare, the Supreme Court upheld the termination of social security benefits of people who had been
deported as for being communists, even though being a communist was lawful activity at the time.
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-21 (1960). The dissents protested that the withdrawal of benefits
violated the First Amendment, id. at 621 (Black, J., dissenting), constituted a bill of attainder, id.; id. at 628
(Douglas, J., dissenting), and violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws and imposition of
punishment without a judicial trial, id. at 634 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas,
J.). See generally Karen M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making
of “New Property,” 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 379 (2008) (commenting on connection of case to later
constitutional law developments).
57
Some companies tried to self-insure their workers or purchase insurance for them in the era preceding the
New Deal, but eventually many corporate leaders supported public programs to achieve the same result.
See BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, supra note __, at 14-31 (describing early private efforts), 60-66 (describing
later private efforts); 106-23 (describing significant corporate support for public efforts, despite major
opposition from other business elements).
58
See BERKOWITZ, supra note __ [Monroe], at 52-53 (noting prohibitive rates for disability insurance prior
to institution of federal program); Kearney, supra note __, at 3 (“During the Great Depression, . . . [m]any
companies stopped selling disability insurance, others failed financially, and the remainder made changes
in their . . . practices to make themselves less vulnerable to loss. Sales of disability insurance began to
increase after 1940, but the policies were very restrictive.”).
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will opt for coverage.59 With regard to unemployment and some of the other conditions,
they fear that the availability of benefits presents a moral hazard to engage in conduct
that leads to the payout.60 The alternative of personal savings is unrealistic given the
demands of wage-earning individuals to spend their money on current needs. 61 The other
alternative is outright government redistribution of resources, a serious threat to the
existing order.62
In recent years, there have been some challenges to social insurance, primarily to
the old-age retirement program. The primary complaints are that the program has too
great a redistribution effect and does not generate returns as high as private retirement
accounts would achieve.63 These refrains were far more common in the early 1990s than
they are today, and the recent poor performance of the private equities market suggests
that the time for privatizing proposals has passed.64 Moreover, recent demographic

59

See Advisory Council on Social Security, Permanent and Total Disability Insurance, in READINGS IN
SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note __, at 421, 422; see also DOUGLAS, supra note __, at 257-62 (discussing
adverse selection of risks in private pension plans).
60
Regarding moral hazard arguments, see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 237 (1996). Arguments based on moral hazard have frequently been leveled at unemployment
insurance. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, supra note __, at 78-79 (discussing early federal unemployment insurance
proposal offering payment at 100% of prevailing wage rates).
61
See DOUGLAS, supra note __, at 3-7.
62
See Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance: Fairness, Affordability,
and the “Modernization” of Social Security and Medicare, 15 ELDER L.J. 123, 126 (2007) (“Indeed, a
strong historical case can be made that beginning with Otto von Bismarck's social insurance initiatives in
the late nineteenth century, the social provision of income protection against these risks has been a
fundamental precondition for the flourishing of industrial capitalism. Looked at historically, social
insurance is a deeply conservative idea, the major viable alternative to state socialism.”) (footnote omitted).
63
See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler & Maya MacGuineas, Rethinking Social Insurance, The Heritage Foundation
(Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/Research/budget/wp021908.cfm (“The single greatest threat to the
fiscal health of the United States is the runaway growth of the nation's major retirement and health care
entitlement programs.”); Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social Insurance, National Bureau of Economic
Research, http://www.nber.org/feldstein/aeajan8.pdf (visited Aug. 10, 2008) (“The major forms of social
insurance could be improved by shifting to a system that combines government insurance with individual
investment-based accounts . . . .”).
64
Professors Campbell and Morgan contend that support for social insurance approaches has always
remained strong among the American population as a whole, but that the views of some of the affluent
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trends are making the economics of the retirement trust fund look more optimistic than
had once been projected;65 very modest alterations are all that will be needed to keep the
program solvent and retain its slight redistribution effect.66 Similarly modest changes
could ensure the actuarial soundness of the DI fund well into the future.67 Despite the
aging of the population, there is even some reason to believe that disability benefits
applications may decrease due to projected long-term declines in industrial injuries and
disease as the American economy shifts further over time from manufacturing to
services. 68 With regard to DI, the idea of private accounts is hardly an appealing

policy-making elites have shifted away from support for payroll taxes over time. Campbell & Morgan,
supra note __, at 174.
65
Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration, The 2008 OASDI Trustees Report,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR08/IV_LRest.html#239829 (“The estimated deficits for the OASI, DI,
and combined OASDI programs in this report are improved as compared to those shown in last year’s
report for the longer valuation periods.”); see Paul Krugman, Look and Feel 15 Years Younger!, The
Conscience of a Liberal (Mar. 25, 2008), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/look-and-feel-15years-younger/ (“In fact, however, the [Social Security] actuarial balance has been improving rather than
worsening. It’s now better than it’s been since 1993. What this tells us is that projections made in the midto-late 1990s were, in the light of subsequent revisions, way too pessimistic.
Moral: Social Security’s financial problem is relatively minor. It doesn’t deserve the emphasis it receives
from most pundits.”).
66
See Altman, supra note __ at 1153-60 (suggesting retention of existing earned income tax credit,
restoring the maximum taxable wage base to 90% of wages in covered employment, considering
conversion of the estate tax as structured in 2009 into a Social Security tax in 2010, and allowing the
government to invest some of the trust fund amount in private equity funds, as the Railroad Retirement
Board currently does).
67
See Stephen C. Goss, The Financial Outlook for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, SOC.
SEC. BULL., No. 3, 2005-06, at 47, 51-52 (discussing possible reallocation of retirement and disability
components of payroll tax, alteration of application of vocational criteria in disability definition, and returnto-work initiatives).
68
Kalman Rupp & David Stapleton, Determinants of the Growth in the Social Security Administration’s
Disability Programs—An Overview, SOC. SEC. BULL., Winter, 1995, at 43, 51 (“The short-term effect of
economic restructuring is thought to increase applications, because disabled workers who lose their
manufacturing jobs may choose to apply for disability benefits rather than find new work in the service
sector. The long term effect may be to decrease applications, however, because service sector workers are
less susceptible to disabling injuries and illnesses.”). Sources on the shift from manufacturing to services
abound. E.g., A. Michele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J.
135 137 (2008)
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alternative to social insurance, given that individuals are unlikely to have the time to save
adequate amounts before the onset of disability. 69
The availability of the social insurance also functions as a compulsory employee
benefit, and for that reason rewards for work and creates an incentive for people to keep
working. When a certain baseline of work history or current labor force attachment is
required, individuals have an incentive to become employed and stay in the workforce.70
When benefits are pegged to strongly to contributions, as with the American system of
Disability Insurance and Old-Age Insurance, there is an incentive to work at higherincome employment to maximize the payout when disability or retirement occurs.71
Moreover, if catastrophic events such as the death, inability to work, or prolonged
hospitalization of a family breadwinner would wipe out the resources of even the most
prudent saver, incentives to work hard and engage in prudent saving are turned upside
down. Social insurance to cover the worst costs of those events places incentives back
where they belong.
Means-tested programs that lack work-relatedness are welfare, and fall outside the
definition of social insurance.72 Popular, judicial, and other sources have strongly

69

Patrick Wiese, Financing Disability Benefits in a System of Individual Accounts: Lessons from
International Experience (Jan. 1, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1151238.
70
BERKOWITZ, supra note __ [Ball], at 23 (“By tying the payments to working, the incentive for people to
work could be preserved, and an American welfare state might be instituted that maintained the efficiency
of America’s capitalist economy.”).
71
See J. Douglas Brown, Developments in the Social Security Program, in READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY,
supra note __, at 121, 127 (“But any effective system of social security must enhance incentive [to work],
whenever possible, rather than impair it . . . . This can be done through social insurance under which
eligibility and benefits are related to past earnings and productivity . . . .”).
72
OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION AND STATISTICS, UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD v-vii (1997) (distinguishing
social insurance systems from means-tested programs limited to needy applicants); see ALTMEYER, supra
note __, at 5 (describing origins of Social Security Act) (“While social insurance was regarded as the chief
instrumentality to be relied on protection against want, it was recognized that it would be necessary to
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resisted the concept of welfare rights, despite the efforts of advocates to portray what is
more often called “assistance” as “entitlements.”73 Critics have rarely and unsuccessfully
challenged existing social insurance and the popular view that it is an entitlement.74
III. Social Insurance Against What?
The obvious answer to the question of what social insurance ought to insure
against is whatever insecurities ordinary citizens fear and the market does not offer
protection against. The historical record indicates that in the United States those risks are
industrial accidents and disease; temporary unemployment due to reasons that are beyond
employees’ control; inability to work due to advanced age; inability to work due to
disability; and various attendant medical and related costs.75 In other developed countries

supplement this protection in a certain proportion of cases by providing public assistance in accordance
with individual needs.”).
73
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (“[T]he intractable economic, social, and even
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.
The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare administration . . . .
But the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult
responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.”); see
also Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions (Abstract), ExpressO (2008),
http://works.bepress.com/elizabeth_pascal/1/ (“Although nearly two dozen state constitutions contain some
type of affirmative guarantee of welfare rights, state courts are extremely reluctant to enforce these
rights.”). The welfare rights concept is a frequent target of neoconservative movement writers. See, e.g.,
David Kelley, Last Rites for Welfare Rights?, Cato Institute (Nov. 10, 1998),
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5788. Other sources note the popular or political resistance
to welfare rights without editorializing. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity
Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. ,
Winter-Spring 2000, at 257, 258 (2000) (“Establishing an unassailable right to welfare was once an
important goal of legal academics and activists, but is no longer.”); John Arthur O’Connor, From Welfare
Rights to Welfare Fights: Neo-Liberalism and the Retrenchment of Social Provision (2002) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3056266/
(describing reaction against welfare rights in several countries).
74
But see supra text accompanying notes ___ (describing recent reaction against some forms of social
insurance or its expansion); see also supra note __ (discussing Flemming v. Nestor).
75
See BERKOWITZ, supra note __ [Ball], at 23 (noting of influential early Social Security Advisory
Committee report that “The basic idea that animated the report was that contributory social insurance
should be used to defend the nation against the inherent insecurities of the modern economy.” ).
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(and to some extent in the United States), programs also protect against life hazards such
as temporary illness and partial disability.76
Social insurance insures against discrimination as well as the specific risks that
are the programs’ focus. This point at first seems counterintuitive, but an analysis of the
programs shows that some of the hazards against which they protect are more the social
attitudes that keep people from working to support themselves than physical or mental
inability to support oneself by doing what work requires. The Disability Insurance
program recognizes that people over 55 with a limited education may still be capable of
performing various jobs, but are highly unlikely to be hired for them, and so the program
applies a laxer standard for eligibility for that group.77 Early sources on social security
for old age recognized the difficulty of being hired when a person is elderly even if that
individual is perfectly capable of working, just as they recognized the increased
likelihood of physical and mental decline with age.78 Even some government welfare
programs are in reality a form of protection against discrimination, and that fact helps
76

See Weber, supra note __[Ill.], at 945 (collecting sources regarding European programs). In the United
States, workers compensation programs allow partial disability benefits, often in the form of benefits for a
specified number of benefit weeks proportional to the gravity of the impairment. See Peter S. Barth,
Compensating Workers for Permanent Partial Disabilities, SOC. SEC. BULL., No. 4, 2003-04, at 16
(collecting data on state programs). Veterans Administration benefits also provide partial disability
pensions. Interestingly, a few people have criticized presidential candidate John McCain for receiving
these benefits based on his war injuries, see Why is John McCain getting $58,000 in disability (taxfree)?,
Coffee Stained News’s Weblog (June 10, 2008), http://coffeestainednews.wordpress.com/2008/06/10/whyis-john-mccain-getting-58000-in-disability-taxfree/, but there is little general political opposition to the
payment of partial disability awards to injured veterans.
77
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1562 (2008) (“If you have a severe, medically determinable impairment(s) (see §§
404.1520(c), 404.1521, and 404.1523), are of advanced age (age 55 or older, see § 404.1563), have a
limited education or less (see § 404.1564), and have no past relevant work experience (see § 404.1565), we
will find you disabled. If the evidence shows that you meet this profile, we will not need to assess your
residual functional capacity or consider the rules in appendix 2 to this subpart.”). A relaxed standard also
applies for persons with a marginal education and work experience of thirty-five or more years of nothing
but arduous unskilled physical labor. § 404.1562(a). These provisions appear to take into account the
reality of discrimination against aging workers in the physical labor employment market.
78
See, e.g., Douglas, supra note __, at 5-6 (noting decline in employment of elderly workers as industry
replaced farm employment and difficulty of elderly persons in finding work after losing jobs).
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explain their historical trajectory. For example, from the 1930s to the 1990s, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) provided long-term assistance to mothers
who lacked the support of a man and who faced overwhelming discrimination on the
basis of sex if they looked for wage employment.79 As the social perception about the
prevalence of sex discrimination changed, the political support for paying anything but
short-term support to single mothers declined80 and AFDC was replaced with a program
of temporary assistance to needy families.81
IV. Social Insurance and the Civil Rights Model of Disability
The role of social insurance in protecting against the harms of discrimination
brings the discussion back to civil rights model of disability. This model, sometimes
thought of as the civil rights, minority group, or social relations approach, employs the

79

Until quite recently, employment discrimination against women was the legal rule rather than the
unlawful exception. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding law barring most
employment of women bartenders); Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (upholding law forbidding
women from employment in restaurants late at night); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding
bar against women practicing law). The prohibition on sex discrimination in employment in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was inserted as an amendment by opponents of the bill in order to defeat the race
discrimination provisions. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
(describing prohibition on sex discrimination as “the gambit of a congressman seeking to scuttle adoption
of the Civil Rights Act.”). Although Congress called the bluff of the opponent, that occurred more than a
generation after the adoption of federally supported welfare for mothers who lacked a husband or other
man to support their children.
80
Without linking the phenomenon to changing perceptions regarding the prevalence of sex discrimination,
Professor Wax observes that support for traditional AFDC declined with changes in social expectations and
the feeling that needs should be met by collective resources only when the needs are not the result of an
individual’s voluntary decisions. Wax, supra note __, at 275 (“Because the program was confined to single
parents with children, it denied benefits to most able-bodied men. The expectation that able-bodied women
would work was not part of the program's design at its inception. On the contrary, the program
implemented the understanding that single mothers should personally care for their children, which
required them to depend on public support. Twenty-five years after the enactment of the AFDC legislation,
however, the consensus that single mothers should depend on the government began to fade as more
mothers started to work and the number of out-of wedlock births exploded.”).
81
As part of the 1996 federal welfare revisions, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)
program replaced AFDC. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. In the absence of a hardship exception (which no more than 20% of
recipients may be granted), an individual may receive aid for no more than five years in his or her lifetime.
42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A), (C) (2000).
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insight that conditions often thought of as disabling do not themselves disable. Instead,
barriers created by the environment or by social attitudes keep persons with physical or
mental differences from full and equal participation in society. 82 This model contrasts
with the medical model, which focuses on the individual’s departures from the physical
or mental norm in accounting for disability.83 The medical model suggests an emphasis
on fixing the individual with a disability through medical treatment; the civil rights model
places the emphasis on fixing the environment by eliminating physical and attitudinal
barriers.84 In the most common illustration, the medical model would stress rehabilitation
of a person with paraplegia, 85 or if that cannot succeed, persuading the person to accept
his or her limits and adjust psychologically to them. The civil rights model would point
out that the disabling condition is not, or at least not simply, the paraplegia, but the fact
that stairs, curbs, and other artificial obstacles prevent the movement of persons who
have to rely on wheelchairs or other mobility aids to get around. The model would stress
altering the environment.86
There are writers who distinguish between what they term a social model, which
embodies the basic insight about how the social environment or attitude interacts with
physical or mental traits of individuals to cause “disability,” and what they call a civil

82

See supra text accompanying notes ___ (describing model).
Much recent writing discusses the role of the norm or normal in separating out persons with disabilities
and assigning them inferior roles. See, e.g., LENNARD J. DAVIS, BENDING OVER BACKWARDS: DISABILITY,
DISMODERNISM, & OTHER DIFFICULT POSITIONS 116-18 (2002) (noting role of normal, contrasted with role
of ideal, in separating persons with disabilities from others); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 173-224 (1990) (suggesting movement away
from emphasis on classification of individuals and towards emphasis on relations among people).
84
See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649 (1999).
85
See RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE
WORKPLACE 207-21 (2001) (contrasting rehabilitation emphasis of medical approaches to disability with
legal emphasis related to civil rights approach).
86
See Crossley, supra note __, at 658-59 (discussing alterations in physical environment and social policy).
83
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rights model, which proceeds from that insight to note that society imposes disadvantage
on persons with disabilities in much the same way that it does on other minorities, and
prescribes social solutions (such as the ADA and other civil rights laws) to end the
disadvantage.87 For purposes of the discussion here, however, the social model and the
civil rights model will be considered together as the civil rights model.
Some recent writing challenges various aspects of the civil rights model or its
applications,88 but the model has been the critical development in thinking about
disability for more than a generation.89 It was an essential part of the intellectual
groundwork that led to the ADA.90 The model has recently received criticism on the
ground that, at least in its unadorned form as the social relations approach, it does not
justify policy prescriptions for changing the physical and social environment: Even one

87

See Hensel, supra note __, at 147-50. See generally Ravi A. Malhotra, The Duty to Accommodate
Unionized Workers with Disabilities in Canada and the United States: A Counter-Hegemonic Approach, 2
J.L. & EQUALITY 92, 108 (2003) (“It is important to note that there is no single, universally accepted
conception of the social-political model.”).
88
E.g., James Leonard, The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil Rights Concepts Has
Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (2005); Marta Russell, Backlash, The
Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, 21 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 335 (2000)
(criticizing liberal policy assumptions behind ADA); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA=s Revolving Door:
Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (2001) (noting limits on civil rights
approach as embodied in ADA); Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist
Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889 (suggesting need for Apost-integrationist@ approach); see also Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 1416
(2007) (“An absolutist integrationist perspective disserves the disability community by supporting an
inappropriately high threshold for the development and retention of disability-only services and
institutions.”). Others have defended the model. See, e.g., JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US
WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND E MPOWERMENT 127 (1998) (defending minority group-civil
rights model of disability).
89
In a highly influential 1966 article, Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd Matson foreshadowed the development
of the civil rights model by contrasting “custodialism” with “integrationism.” See tenBroek & Matson,
supra note __, at 816.
90
See Hensel, supra note __, at 150 (“[S]ome scholars have credited the political awareness engendered by
the minority model for the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act and comparable civil rights
legislation.”) (collecting authorities); see also Weber, supra note __ [Ill.] at 903-904 (discussing connection
between insights of civil rights approach and terms of ADA). Others have noted that the model provided a
new basis for self-awareness and shared identity for persons with disabilities. See, e.g., JENNIFER L.
ERKULWATER, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SAFETY NET 29 (2006).
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who accepts the model’s insight might still conclude, from a libertarian, utilitarian, or
even egalitarian perspective, that trying to change the individual or even doing nothing, is
preferable to some environmental changes.91 This point would seem obvious. Many,
perhaps most, middle aged persons are disabled from reading fine print. Nobody
proposes that all reading materials (the environment and its artificial barrier) be made
large-print when the easy personal adaptation of reading glasses (an individual, medicalappliance fix) is available. The point of the social relations or civil rights model is
instead that paying attention to the role of the environment opens up the option of
changing social conditions and attitudes and demonstrates the injustice of refusing to do
so when changes in the environment would be justified under whatever social philosophy
one embraces. 92 For those committed to egalitarian ideals, significant environmental
changes are indicated.93 This is why the model moves so seamlessly from social relations
to civil rights, and why the civil rights model is so critical in discussing modern policy
prescriptions. 94
The paradox of one policy prescription—social insurance—for the civil rights
model is that the civil rights model postulates that disability is by no means a hazard of
life, but instead an inevitability of life. It need not lead to separation from the work force,

91

Adam Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1285-1306
(2007).
92
See ERKULWATER, supra note __, at 30-31 (noting role of social model in shifting focus of advocacy
groups towards changes in social environment).
93
See, e.g., CHARLTON, supra note __, at 89-91 (stressing importance of social safety net).
94
This is not to deny that there may be an imperfect fit with traditional concepts of civil rights developed in
the sex and race context when the civil rights model is applied to employment discrimination. See Leonard,
supra note __, at 32-34. But see Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004) (stressing comparison of ADA
obligations with duties to avoid race and sex discrimination that also impose costs on employers); Samuel
R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89
VA. L. REV. 825 (2003) (same).

© Mark C. Weber 2008. Unpublished manuscript. All rights reserved. Do not distribute
without permission.

22
except for the stubborn failure of employers to adapt their workplaces and attitudes. One
would think that it hardly makes sense to insure against the benighted attitudes of
employers.
But then again, perhaps it does. Although it might be nobler to take arms against
a sea of troubles and by opposing end them, individuals might well support government
programs that keep them from suffering the worst effects of discrimination’s slings and
arrows. If the analysis is correct that even traditional programs in the form of old-age
pensions and welfare for impoverished families are to a great degree addressed to
discrimination, having social insurance be available to the class of individuals who
experience pervasive discrimination in employment is highly sensible.
There is the drawback, of course, that the availability of the social insurance
eliminates the most powerful incentive to press for social change to end discrimination on
the basis of disability. It is hardly surprising that the existence of a social program
eliminating the worst risks of an undesirable situation might undercut support for doing
anything about the situation. One economic study even purports to show that the
availability of generous old-age pensions and unemployment insurance in European
countries correlates negatively with support for revolution.95 But social insurance in its
current form is not so fully compensatory that it takes away all the incentive to push to
end discriminatory practices and attitudes.
Moreover, social insurance protects against risks other than discrimination.96
Even if somehow the problem of diminished economic opportunity for people with
95

Robert MacCulloch, Does Social Insurance Help Secure Property Rights (2001), Social Science Research
Network, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=265436.
96
See supra text accompanying notes ____ (discussing social insurance’s role in protecting against income
loss because of disability or other reasons).
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disability due to discrimination were solved, and increasingly experts in the legal field
despair that the problem will be solved, 97 simply living with a disability is expensive.
Services and items that make life easier (or even possible) are under the control of the
medical establishment, and medical costs must be paid;98 work time must also be lost for
the privilege of incurring the expense.99 If attendant services are needed for ordinary life
activities, that cost must be borne. It is hardly outlandish to think of uncovered expenses
of these types as discrimination. In a society committed to the principle of antisubordination, the ordinary costs of survival would not be placed on a stigmatized class
of individuals when the very weight of the costs contributes to their social
disadvantage.100 Expenses associated with adapting to structures of society created
without people with disabilities in mind would decline if an anti-subordinationist society
replaced the structures with better alternatives.101
But reconceptualizing the costs as discrimination does not pay them. At the
present time, few programs other than social insurance exist to take the expense of
appliances, attendants, and anything but the limited accommodations covered by the
97

See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239,
240 (2001) (statistical analysis reporting poor plaintiff success rate in ADA employment cases); Louis S.
Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The Fading Promise of ADA Enforcement in the
Federal Courts Under Title I and Its Impact Upon the Poor, 8 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 595 (2005)
(reporting low success rate in Eastern District of Pennsylvania); Michael Waterstone, The supra note __, at
1826 (contrasting failure rate in employment litigation with successes in non-employment ADA
enforcement). This situation may, of course, be ameliorated by the recently enacted ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
98
Walter Y. Oi, Disability and a Workfare-Welfare Dilemma, in DISABILITY AND WORK 31, 37 (Carolyn L.
Weaver ed. 1991) (“The disabled make nearly three times as many physician visits a year and purchase
more than four times as many prescriptions as individuals with no activity limitations.”).
99
Id. at 40 (“Disability steals time.”).
100
See Colker, supra note __ [Disability] (discussing anti-subordination as a theory and as applied to
disability); cf. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003 (1986) (developing anti-subordination principle for evaluating social policies in connection with
sex and race inequality).
101
See Colker, supra note __ [Disability] at 1447 (stating that anti-subordination would dictate placing
costs of humane institutions for persons with severe disabilities on society as a whole);
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Americans with Disabilities Act off the shoulders of people with disabling conditions.102
As Professor Bagenstos and others have noted, courts have been particularly solicitous in
making sure that employers are free from any requirement to fund accommodations that
are not directly related to the task of performing the job at the workplace. 103 Social
insurance is one of the few sources that currently occupies the cost-shifting role. Given
its political attractiveness and durability, it may be the mechanism of choice for future
expansion of cost-shifting.
Moreover, the societies in which social insurance systems are found are those in
which people must sell their labor in exchange for the means of living. Disability often,
though not always, diminishes what persons with disabilities may have to offer in the
labor market.104 Limits on stamina reduce the hours that a person can trade for wages.105
If some classes of jobs that require physical strength or mental capacity of one or another
sort are off the bargaining table for a given individual, that person is forced to settle for

102

Financial and in-kind costs associated with living with a disability in society as presently constituted
may also be borne by relatives and other caregivers, of course, but similarly few mechanisms exist to shift
these costs from the persons on whom they currently fall. See Eva Feder Kittay et al., Dependency,
Difference and the Global Ethic of Longterm Care, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 443 (2005) (discussing caregiving).
103
Bagenstos, supra note __ [Future] at 35 (“The ‘job-related’ rule plainly rules out a number of
accommodations that could be provided at reasonable cost and without undue hardship and that, while
necessary to enable many individuals to work, also provide off-the-job benefits.”). Accommodations that
have been rejected include assistive technology to enable an employee to get to work, medical treatment
and rehabilitation to enable a person to perform work, and additional training to facilitate a new job when
the person cannot perform the current one due to disability; the provision of personal assistance off the job
is far beyond what courts will require. Id. at 36 (collecting cases).
104
Obviously, some individuals may, by superhuman effort, compensate for job-related limits, but public
policy should not be based on the requirement that people put forth heroic efforts over long periods of time.
Moreover, relying on the “overcomer” image of people with disabilities advances the idea that people with
disabilities, while “inspirational,” are still are to be “patronized, pitied, and excluded for being different.”
Drimmer, supra note __, at 1354. That a person has overcome something suggests an inferiority of the
person with whatever has to be overcome. SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY 18 (1998).
105
Susan Wendell, Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 260, 271
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 1997) (“[M]any (perhaps most) disabilities reduce or consume the energy and
stamina of people who have them and do not just limit them in some particular kind of physical activity.”);
see also Beth Torgerson, I’m Sick and Tired of Being Sick and Tired: Living with Post-Viral Fatigue, 20
DISABILITY STUD. Q. 54 (2000) (describing reality of chronic disabling condition).
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employment that may not pay as well as other work. At the extremes, highly mechanized
societies where the fastest growing sectors of the economy sell information and
intellectual products may offer few opportunities to those with severe cognitive
impairments, creating an ongoing likelihood of very low wage employment or no
employment at all.106 Structural conditions of this type are not easily amenable to change
in a free market system where demand for and supply of labor dictate which jobs are
available at what rates of pay.107 Recognition of this fact and altering policy to account
for it may entail a departure from the civil rights model, of course.108 A realist might say
that at least in a market economy, the disabling conditions are disabling, and that is that.
But reading the civil rights model at its broadest, it might be observed that one of the
disabling environmental barriers is that for most people support does not come without
the sale of labor, and one of the disabling attitudes is believing that condition cannot
change. Thus the civil rights model of disability may be the appropriate lens through
which to view the problem after all. The solution, however, may still be social insurance.
There remains the concern—directly tied to the problem the civil rights model
tries to solve—that social insurance reinforces the impression that disability is a medical
106

See Disability Policy Panel, National Academy of Social Insurance, Rethinking Disability Policy: The
Role of Income, Health Care, Rehabilitation, and Related Services in Fostering Independence, SOC. SEC.
BULL., Summer, 1994, at 56, 61 (“Structural changes in the labor market have long-term effects on
employment opportunities for particular groups of workers, including those with disabilities. On the one
hand, analysis of earnings level trends show[s] a declining demand for workers with limited educations and
job skill. . . . On the other hand, the shift from manufacturing to service sector jobs is projected to increase
jobs for well-educated workers which would mean that highly skilled workers with physical disabilities
will have better opportunities to find work. At the same time, workers with cognitive limitations or mental
illness may still have difficulty finding work.”).
107
This situation, of course, exacerbates the problem of persons whose disabilities prevent them from
entering the labor market or persisting there long enough to obtain coverage under social insurance. Their
needs must be met by other initiatives. See infra text accompanying notes ___ (describing difficulties with
extending social insurance model to provide support to persons without adequate prior connection to
workforce).
108
This is the premise of Weber, supra note __[Ill.].
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condition, and a pitiable one at that: Social insurance protects against the loss of income
caused by the medically determined defect in the person with the disability (albeit in
relation to social attitudes and conditions), and defects mean disadvantage in society. For
just this reason, some disability advocates hesitate to push for enhanced publicly funded
benefits, including expanded social insurance.109 It might be noted, however, that
economic security per se often helps elevate the social status of those identified by a
given characteristic,110 a fact that suggests that greater social insurance may make
disability seem less pitiable. Attitudes towards people who are elderly are less
condescending, less pitying, than they were before those individuals had an independent
source of income.111 A similar change might occur if more individuals with disabilities
were covered by social insurance and received more livable amounts from it.
V. Expanding Social Insurance
Only a fraction of persons with disabilities currently receive benefits from
American social insurance programs, largely because eligibility is tied to the hazard of
unemployment on account of disability and all those who engage in substantial gainful

109

See ERKULWATER, supra note __, at 61 (“[In the 1980s and 1990s], some disabled activists, particularly
those affiliated with the independent living movement, were ambivalent about endorsing enhanced social
welfare programs, a division within the disabled community that impeded advocacy efforts to present a
united front on behalf of an expanded safety net . . . . As some disability rights activists pointed out, social
welfare programs were premised on the assumption that a disabled person was helpless, and the state
offered support out of a sense of charity or pity.”). But see CHARLTON, supra note __, at 90 (stressing
importance of public programs in permitting full social participation by persons with disabilities).
110
SPECIAL TASK FORCE, SEC’Y OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 34-36 (1973) (noting
that income is principal determinant of social status).
111
Paul Douglas noted with regard to the original Social Security bill that senators and representatives from
the South opposed efforts to set national standards for federally supported state welfare payments to the
elderly because of fear that higher payments would raise the status of African-Americans. See DOUGLAS,
supra note __, at 100. Social Security payments have vastly improved the economic lot of elderly persons.
Altman, supra note __, at 1142 (“The reduction in the poverty rate of the elderly is directly due to Social
Security.”).
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activity are ineligible to enroll112 The standard for disability is also very severe.113 In
fact, of all the individuals placed on the DI rolls in a given year, one-eighth die within
two years.114 The proportion of individuals who die during their first six months on DI is
fourteen times that of retirees during their first six months on the Social Security old-age
insurance program.115 The degree of disability demanded is extreme in comparison to
that required by disability insurance programs in other countries.116 Given the severity of
the existing disability standard, and the low level of SSI benefits for persons who lack
long-term connection to the work force before becoming disabled, it is no surprise that
the prevalence of poverty among adults with disabilities that affect work is three times
that of the general population.117 A lower disability threshold would be desirable, and
would hardly undermine the incentives to work that currently exist in the national
economy.118

112

Under some circumstances they may be able to resume working under work incentive programs for a
period of time while collecting reduced benefit amounts. See Kearney, supra note __, at 20 (collecting
information regarding existing work incentives).
113
See, e.g., Tommasetti v. Astrue, No. 06-55999, 2008 WL 2762439 (9th Cir. July 17, 2008) (affirming
denial of benefits on ground that applicant failed to meet eligibility standard on basis of diabetes and back
pain); Eichstadt v. Astrue, No. 06-4295, 2008 WL 2764636 (July 17, 2008) (affirming denial of benefits on
ground that applicant failed to meet eligibility standard on basis of fibromyalgia); Bradley v. Astrue, 528
F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of benefits on ground that applicant failed to meet eligibility
standard on basis of HIV).
114
Walter Y. Oi, Employment and Benefits for People with Diverse Disabilities, in DISABILITY, WORK AND
CASH BENEFITS, supra note __, at 103, 113 (analyzing Social Security Administration data).
115
Martynas A. Ycas, Patterns of Return to Work in a Cohort of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries, in
DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note __, at 169, 171.
116
See ERKULWATER, supra note __, at 237.
117
Mitchell P. LaPlante et al., Disability and Employment, Disability Statistics Abstract (Jan. 1996), at
dsc.ucsf.edu/view_pdf.php?pdf_id=13. Fully 34% of people with disabilities live in households with
annual incomes of $15,000 or less. Phoebe Ball et al., Breaking the Cycle of Poverty: Asset Accumulation
by People with Disabilities , 26 DISABILITY STUD. Q. No. 1 (2006) (citing 2005 Harris Poll data). One-fifth
of wheelchair users live in poverty. H. Stephen Kaye et al., Wheelchair Use in the United States, Disability
Statistics Center (May 2002), http://dsc.ucsf.edu/publication.php.
118
See Weber, supra note __ [Ill.], at 951 (proposing lower DI-SSI disability standard); cf. Jerry L.
Mashaw, Book Review, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 225 226 (1995) (reviewing Edward H. Yelin.
Disability and the Displaced Worker (1993)) (describing existing DI benefits, “[I]t is peculiar to imagine
that a person who can continue to work will instead leave work to seek disability benefits that pay (on
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Moreover, far more individuals who realistically should be considered persons
with disabilities ought to receive non-means-tested partial disability, temporary disability,
and sick leave insurance, benefits provided almost universally in advanced countries
other than the United States for persons with an adequate lifetime connection to the work
force. Of course, in other developed countries, free or low cost medical care is also taken
for granted,119 and introduction of that innovation in the United States would be a
tremendous help to persons with disabilities who now must pay enormous portions of
their incomes for medical costs or private insurance to meet those costs.
Temporary disability insurance was part of the agenda of early social security
advocates.120 Opposition by the medical establishment derailed national health insurance,
and took temporary disability with it.121 Partial disability benefits never had a chance for
a full hearing in the United States, despite their prevalence elsewhere in the developed
world.122 Partial and temporary disability insurance programs should return to the agenda
of social reformers.123 Significantly, they may prove popular even in an era that views

average) one-third of the mean wage, require a six-month waiting period for application, a two-year waiting
period for medical benefits, and provide any benefit to fewer than one-half of those who apply.”).
119
See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, E VALUATION AND STATISTICS, supra note __ [World], at xviii-xix (describing
medical benefits programs). See generally Julie Rovner, In Switzerland, An Easier Path for the Disabled,
NPR (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93098547&ft=1&f=1001
contrasting experience of families with autistic children in Switzerland with national health and disability
insurance, as opposed to United States).
120
See WITTE, supra note __, at 208; President’s Message to Congress on Social Security Expansion, 1948
U.S.C. CONG. SERV. 2489, 2490-91.
121
See supra text accompanying notes __ (discussing history of New Deal social insurance proposals).
122
As noted, partial disability benefits are also the rule in the United States with regard to impairments
related to specific causes, as with service-connected benefits for veterans, injuries and diseases at work
covered by workers’ compensation, and tortious injuries. See Weber, supra note __, at 943-45 (collecting
relevant sources).
123
See id. at 943-47 (discussing policy advantages of partial disability benefits). Interestingly, an expert
panel convened by the National Academy of Social Insurance at the invitation of the House Ways and
Means Committee’s Social Security Subcommittee supported the concept of temporary disability
insurance, but believed that Congress would not pass such a program at the time the panel met in the early
1990s. Jerry L. Mashaw & Virginia Reno, Social Security Disability Insurance: A Policy Review, in NEW
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entitlements with skepticism. They are, after all, tied to work, and if means tests are not
employed, will maximize incentives to work.124 The success of the resistance to
privatizing United States Social Security shows the lasting foundation of support for
contributory social insurance.
Partial and temporary disability insurance will cost money, but the same reforms
that could put the Social Security trust funds on a sounder footing could be used to
finance an expansion of benefits. Moreover, non-means-tested partial benefits would be
a exceedingly powerful work incentive, because a person will no longer have to
completely drop out of the work force to obtain necessary support when a medical
condition arises or worsens.125 Experts identify delay in leaving the work force as the
critical area in which work incentives can conserve DI expenditures. 126
Whether the potential support for expansion of social insurance is broad enough
to extend coverage to the hazards of unemployment or sub-subsistence employment by
those whose congenital or early-acquired disabilities prevent them from ever entering the
APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 245, 261 (Terry Thomason et al. eds. 1998). The panel
noted the appeal of partial disability benefits, but was concerned about potential costs and did not advocate
that step. Id. at 262.
124
Work incentive programs have been the major innovation in the DI and SSI programs in recent years.
See Weber, supra note __ [Ill.] at 936-38 (describing work incentives). The key work incentive, of course,
is simply the absence of a means test. A means test is an obvious barrier to earning income or
accumulating assets. Asset accumulation is critical to ensuring long-term economic well-being. Although
some mechanisms exist to permit earning income and accumulating minimal amounts of assets, significant
loosening of existing restrictions will permit more people to escape poverty. See Ball et al., supra note __.
SSI assets limits discourage savings and encourage unwise spending habits. Douglas A. Martin, The ADA
and Disability Benefits Policy, 6 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 1, 6 (1995). As Professor Bloch notes,
carefully designed social insurance reforms can provide incentives to build the employment capacity of
persons with disabilities and facilitate integration (or reintegration) into the workforce. Frank S. Bloch,
Disability and the Contract for Income Support in the Modern Welfare State (Sept. 20, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022982.
125
See Monroe Berkowitz, Reflections of the Honoree, National Academy of Social Insurance (June 21,
2006) (suggesting breaking link between work test and benefits eligibility),
http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/MonroeBerkowitz_NASI_Presentation_06_21_06.pdf.
126
See, e.g., Mashaw & Reno, supra note __ [NEW APPROACHES], at 254-55 (advocating tax changes to
create incentives to stay at work after onset of disabling condition).
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labor force so as to achieve insured status is another matter. At the moment, these
persons are covered by the means-tested Supplemental Security Income program, which
applies the same test for total disability as the Disability Insurance program but generally
provides much lower benefits, only about 70% of the federal poverty level. 127 It is
possible to view as an ordinary life hazard the risk of a lifelong condition that makes it
difficult or impossible to enter the labor market as that market currently exists. But in the
absence of a connection to the labor force for that individual, the traditional rationale of
social insurance is lacking. Benefits for disabled adult children of deceased, retired, and
disabled wage-earners are perhaps the closest the current American system comes to
covering persons with no connection to the work force under the social insurance, as
opposed to the welfare, rubric. 128 Thus even vastly greater development of social
insurance along conventional lines will not provide economic security to all persons with
disabilities.129 This drawback should not, however, obscure the real gains to be made by
pressing for expansion of social insurance where the enhancement would benefit persons
with disabilities.
Conclusion
Contributory social insurance occupies an important role in the economy and the
society. It protects people against the hazards of modern life while encouraging their
long-term participation in the work force. Disability-related social insurance protects
against the loss of income that comes from disability, but it also protects against the

127

See Weber, supra note __ [Ill.] at 950 (detailing calculation).
See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(F)-(G) (2000) (providing for continued child’s benefits into adulthood for
covered individual’s dependent children with disabilities).
129
For this reason, significant changes in disability-related and other non-social insurance welfare programs
are desirable. See Weber, supra note __ [Ill.] at 950-51.
128

© Mark C. Weber 2008. Unpublished manuscript. All rights reserved. Do not distribute
without permission.

31
harms of discrimination that stem from the social barriers that block persons with
disabilities from reaching their full potential in the workplace. For this reason, it is
consistent with a civil rights approach to disability, a model that recognizes the
importance of environmental and attitudinal obstacles in making physical and mental
differences disabling. Expansion of social insurance is similarly consistent with
recognition that artificial barriers disable. Temporary and partial disability insurance will
do more to ease the effects of discrimination than the current social insurance system can
achieve, and may have incidental effects in raising the economic participation and social
status of persons with disabilities. Too few persons with disabilities have a long-term
connection to the work force for social insurance to alleviate the economic woes of the
entire population of persons with disabilities, but social insurance is a key component of
economic security for persons with disabilities and would become a still more useful one
if expanded.
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